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It would undoubtedly be of immense value if some incisive observer were able to
make a revealing analysis of the process by which facts and values were weighed in
making practical judgments and were able to suggest improvements in the art of practical judgment. However, this book fails in the task which the author has undertaken.
The book is, unfortunately, constructed in too large a part by the "scissors and paste
pot" method of compiling quotations from a great number of prominent authors without adequately correlating them into a well-constructed, cohesive whole. Too large a
portion of the book is devoted to the adulation of Mr. Justice Holmes and to a mere
recital of the facts of his well-known cases. In fact, Mr. Gall fails to extract from any of
the judicial decisions which are considered, or referred to, in his book any direct suggestions for the improvement of the art of making a sound decision in the ordinary
affairs of daily life.
Mr. Gall is probably quite sound in assuming that an acquaintance with some legal
decisions and literature would be very illuminating to a large number of people.
Whether or not it would be sufficient to make them more sophisticated and effective
with respect to the processes which they follow in reaching ordinary decisions is something that remains to be proved. It would seem relevant, for example, to include some
evidence in this type of book to establish that the lawyer, by virtue of his education,
acts in a more informed and enlightened way in reaching a practical judgment than
does the average citizen. It would also seem important to include some more extensive
consideration of the relation between ethical requirements and the making of practical
judgments than this book contains. Students of philosophy will probably also think
that some greater consideration should also be given to the distinction between the
making of theoretical judgments and practical judgments.
Mr. Gall has suggested an interesting and provocative thesis; unfortunately he has
not contributed a great deal to demonstrating its utility or exploring its ramifications.
Perhaps some other examiner into this subject will present a more fruitful consideration of its possibilities in some future book.
STANLEY A. KAPLAN*

Political Reconstruction. By Karl Loewenstein. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946.
Pp. xii, 498. $4.00.
This book, to quote the author's preface, "has one central thesis; namely that the
right of every nation to choose the form of government it pleases, now enshrined in the
Atlantic Charter,, is the safest way to World War 111." 2 The liberal doctrine of noninterference in the political institutions of a foreign state was one thing in the early
nineteenth century, when the drift was toward democracy and when intervention came
from the side of the Holy Alliance; lately, however, its tolerant shelter has proved congenial to dictatorships, fifth columns, and puppet regimes. "No nation after this warleast of all, the defeated Axis states and their satellites-must be permitted to choose
a form of government which fails to conform to political democracy ..... 3 "A Demo* Member of the Illinois Bar.

"Third, they respect the righiof all peoples to choose the form of government under which
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cratic International is the only guarantee of political reconstruction, which, in turn,
will be lasting only if guided by the Categorical Imperative of Political Democracy."4
Professor Loewenstein is a man of accurate learning and extensive observation; his
argument is tightly-jointed. He understands the course by which dictatorships make
their way to power and develops his conclusions with a powerful philosophy. If one
would evade by saying that his scheme for imposing "democratic legitimacy" is impracticable, that events in the year and a half since the book was completed have not
obeyed its precepts, the author has anticipated all that: "Frankly, I do not expect my
suggestions to have any effect after this war .... Perhaps in one hundred or in three
hundred years" this "basic prerequisite of world peace" will have attained acceptance.s
The argument of the book advances by five stages. The first object is to convince the
mind that it is neither necessary nor wise for the international community to maintain
an attitude of unconcern toward domestic violence and oppression in any country.
"The Form of Government" goes on to lay down the "nuclear demands of political
democracy"-the essential features of any government worthy of acceptance into the
society of free nations. It is evident that the Soviet system does not pass muster.
"De Monarchia, Model 1945" discusses European monarchy, a subject which to many
Americans might seem as remote as Graustark and Ruritania. Yet who conversant
with the facts can doubt that the recent maneuverings of Umberto and George II of
Greece have affected adversely the repose of Europe and hence of the world? "The
'Choice' of the Form of Government" discusses with rare insight the ways of provisional governments and resistance movements and the finesse of plebiscites and referenda.
In the anxious undertaking of restoring democratic processes after the fascist paralysis
there are so many ways to do the wrong thing! The book concludes with a call to accept"The Democratic Imperative of Political Reconstruction." Thenationswhichhave
won the right to reorder the world should exploit their victory in grim earnest. An
international bill of rights should be proclaimed and enforcid. And the peoples whose
madness brought the world so near to ruin should undergo a long course of reform and
probation. "Repentance, this time, should come before forgiveness. Political tutelage,
or whatever name be given to Germany's loss of the right of self-rule, is the keystone of
world security." 6
As the instrument for administering this tutelage Dr. Loewenstein proposes an
Inter-Allied Political Control Commission representing the four great powers and those
members of the United Nations which border on the state to be controlled. The executive agent of the IPCC would be a Constitutional Commissioner, supported by an
international staff of specialists. The control would last for years, a decade or longer,
and at the start would be very energetic. As the ward grew in democratic strength the
restraining hand of the guardian would become more gentle. The reviewer is inclined to
believe that Dr. Loewenstein is unduly sanguine about the Inter-Allied Commission as
an instrument of permanent regeneration. During hostilities allied control was exercised-with considerable success, all things considered-in the Mediterranean and
European theaters, as a combined civil affairs operation of the British and the Americans. Their national objectives were generally reconcilable through the Combined
Chiefs of Staff in Washington. But in Greece, it will be remembered, the British had to
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go it alone. It even proved possible to bring the French into this system of control with
respect to Elba and their sector in the assault upon Western Europe. But when the
Western allies and the Soviet Government made contact in Germany and the Balkans,
it was evidently out of the question to establish unified secretariats to administer allied
c6ntrol. In the Balkan areas the Soviet authorities seem to have brooked no interference, even as the British and Americans had acted pretty much on their own in the
Allied Control Council for Italy. Germany, on which all four governments had a hold,
was given a quadripartite Control Council; but this really consists of four separate
secretariats, each controlling its own zone, with a fragile bond tying them for common
counsel at the center. As the hopeful American participants say in effect, We must
make this thing work, for this is the great test of our ability to get on with the Russkies! But the scheme is more to be admired as an experience in working with Soviet
authorities than as an exercise in enlightening the Germans. The American Government has sent many very able men-Dr. Loewenstein among them-to share in these
efforts at allied control; but the possibilities of imposing permanent democratic reforms
by the hand of alien governors are believed to be less promising than the book concedes.
Dr. Loewenstein says candidly that "it is well realized that the condition for successful
operation of the IPCC is continued unity of purpose among the Western powers and
the Soviets. If they should fall apart the entire system of European reconstruction
would fall."
The remark just quoted illustrates the one aspect of the problem--and it is a very
great one-which Dr. Loewenstein declined to explore. Where do the Soviets come in?
Their institutions do not meet the "nuclear demands." It may be possible to attain a
wide acceptance of an international bill of rights; certainly the Roman Catholic nations would generally subscribe to that affirmation of the dignity of the human being,
even if they proved touchy about accepting intervention to redress a breach. But the
Soviets will not accept that formulation of ultimate political values. The Soviet bloc at
the moment stands pre-eminent in urging that the United Nations get tough with the
authoritarian regimes which Dr. Loewenstein would put at the top of the blacklist;
yet some nations which hold membership in the democratic society would support a
demand that somebody (else) stop the Russians. The author has responded "no comment" to this problem, save that "speculation should be left to the radio commentators" and that "politics is the art of the possible."7 The outcome to be hoped for is that
those who maintain the respective systems, democratic and Soviet, may find a basis of
mutual forbearance while the ultimate values in their diverse institutions are being
worked out by a slow and peaceful process of trial and observation and eventual acceptance or rejection by the choice of free people. (Since the Soviets are the newcomers
to the society of nations, self-conscious and-not entirely without reason-inordinately suspicious, it is proper for the established democracies to make doubly sure of the
purity of their own purposes, and then to make a sincere effort to find a common
ground with the puzzling strangers.) Even if the so-called United Nations are as yet
far from agreement on the essentials of a "good" form of government, at any rate they
know some kinds that are "bad," and they recently endured in common the agony of
bringing the worst of them to unconditional defeat. Dr. Loewenstein agrees that a
spirit of understanding between the American, the British and the Soviet nations is a
prerequisite to the political reconstruction he seeks:
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Under no circumstances must ideological differences make us forget the fact that the
United States has fewer points of friction with Russia than with any other great power on this
narrow globe. Both nations are self-contained-both, vigorous and ambitious peoples devoted
to technological progress. If our relations are not disturbed by our differing ideologies, the
three-cornered guardianship will provide the breathing spell which the world needs for finding
its equilibrium. 8
CHrAEEs FAIRmAN*
A Cartel Policy for the United Nations. Edited by Corwin D. Edwards. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1945. Pp. vii, 124. $1.25.
A more appropriate title for this booklet would be: "Cartels-How bad they are
and how to destroy them."
Where the title of the book would lead one to expect an evaluation of cartels, we
find instead a collection of articles-otherwise excellent and well written-all based
upon one premise: Cartels are evil and must be destroyed if at all possible. The book
has a decidedly pessimistic note. Ben W. Lewis cries out almost in desperation: "The
cartel problem will be with us always. We shall not see the time when it will be safe for
us to loosen our grip and turn our backs" (p. 28). The hopelessness of the task in no
way affects his conviction that the noble fight must be continued, for he says: "Even
those persons who can find some positive good in moderate cartel programs carefully
supervised by public authority cannot afford now to aim for less than the complete
elimination of private cartels in international trade" (p. 46). One cannot but admire
Lewis' frank statement: "I do not like them in time of war or in time of peace," but
"those persons" to whom he refers would not therefore accept his interpretation of their
attitude.
It is not usual to find such unanimity of opinion among five authors dealing with
different aspects of the same problem. This harmony of thought is easily accounted for.
All the authors are convinced that the salvation of the world must be sought in free
and effective competition. Starting from that assumption, the argument proceeds with
little difficulty. Seen through these glasses, Fritz Machiup with inescapable logic says:
"The disadvantages of cartels are self-evidence from the very definition: They reduce
competition .... ." (p. 12).
Unfortunately there creeps in a note of inconsistency. For Lewis speaks of "a world
that needs more, and more regular, production, better directed" (p. 26). While there is
room for disagreement with the first part of this statement that what we need is more
and more, the argument defeats itself by calling for a "better directed" production.
This is indeed the crux of the whole matter.
Continued reference to Mr. Berge's thesis that cartels are evil because they will
destroy "our free economic system," rejuvenates the basic premise throughout the
book. The unprejudiced reader, however, cannot but wonder how this typically American point of view will be received abroad where cartels are not looked upon with the
same horror. The gospel that all our economic problems will be solved by a benevolent
Providence-once we do nothing to solve them--comes with poor authority from a
country which has drifted into near chaos as the result of a lack of planning for the
difficult reconversion period.
sp. 397.
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